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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LEON STUCKI,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
JAMES ELLIS, W. H. STEWART, JUNE S. SPACMAN,
CLARE SPACKMAN,
THOMAS A. TARBET, and
MAGNUS OLSEN
Defendants, and Appellant
THOMAS,A. TARBET.

Respondent
W. H. Stewart's

Brief

Appeal from the District Court of the First Judicial
District of the State of Utah, in and for the
County of Cache .

.... ..., ...- v Hon. Marriner M. Morrison, Judge
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In the Supreme Court
of the State of Utah
LEON STUCKI,
Plaintiff and Respondent,
vs.
J~\~IES ELLIS, W. H. STEWART, JUNES. SPACMAN,
CLARE SPACKMAN,
THOi\IAS A. TARBET, and
~LAGNUS OLSEN
Defendants, and Appellant
THO~\'IAS A. TARBET.

Respondent
'W~. H. Stewart's

Brief

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff and respondent has cross appealed against the defendant W. H. Stewart, contending that the
court erred in granting Stewart's motion for nonsuit and
dismissal of plaintiff's action as to him. In resisting this
cross appeal we desire to briefly state the facts as developed at the trial.
The property involved in this action consists of a
small home located at 459 West Center Street, Logan,
Utah. The defendants, June Spackman and Clare Spackman, purchased this property on October 9, 1945; (Ex.
I. Tr. 76) and sold the same to the defendant James C.
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Ellis under written contract (Ex. A, Tr. 51) on October
16, 1945, for the sum of $1,000.00, of which amount $400.
00 was paid in cash, and the balance of $600.00 was payable in monthly payments of $10.00 or more on the 1st
day of each month beginning November 1st, 1945. (Tr.
51 ) . The defendant Ellis then took possession of the
property and resided therein continuously until the 26th
day of February 1946, when he sold the same to the defedant Tarbet (See Exhibits D. H & J. Tr; 52, 53, 54.)
Sometime after Ellis took possession, a portion of
the roof was destroyed by fire, (Tr. 160) and plaintiff
was employed by Ellis during the month of December,
1945, to repair the roof. (Tr. 105) The repairs were
made between January 2nd, and 23rd, 1946. (Tr. 106,
127).
On February 18, 1946, defendant Ellis listed the property for sale with the real estate firm of Stewart and Harrison, of which defendant, Stewart is a partner, (Ex. H.
Tr. 53, 149) and the property was sold by this firm to
the defendant Tarbet for $1500.00; the sale was closed
on February 26th, 1946, from which sale Ellis received
$800.00 in cash. (Ex. D, Tr. 52, 178, 179).
A few days' prior to March 15, 1946, the plaintiff
sent a statement of his account against Ellis for repairing roof to defendant Stewart, which was mailed back to
the plaintiff with the notation thereon that Stewart knew
nothing about the account. ( Tr. 108, 169, 170) The
first time plaintiff and his foreman Roy Earl talked with
Stewart about this account was after Stewart returned the
aforesaid statement to the plaintiff.
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ARGUMENT
It is submitted that the evidence when viewed as a
"Thole will not sustain plaintiff's contention that he relied solely upon Stewarfs alleged promise to pay for the
repairs. In the first place, why should Stewart ptake
such a promise? He had no interest in the property. Ellis was in possession of the same under written contract,
and had paid $400.00 on the purchase price. It is true
that Stewart"s daughter, June Spackman, had an interest
in the property, but she was protected under her contract
of sale. So there is no reason why Stewart, should pay
the repair bill. It is apparent that Ellis informed Stucki
that there was insurance on the home, and that Stewart
was the agent for the insurance company. And there is
a strong inference from the evidence that the account was
charged to Ellis alone, since one of the sales slips, was referred to as having been signed by Ellis. ( Tr. 121) If
plaintiff had relied solely upon Stewart's promise to pay
the bill and had charged the work and material against
Stewart, why did he not bring the account into court?
The burden of proof was (upon plaintiff to establish this
fact. And moreover, if plaintiff relied solely upon Stewart, and not Ellis, then why is Ellis made a party defendant, and why are the other defendants sued?
It is rather singular that plaintiff would place all his
reliance upon Stewart's promise to pay the bill, and then
wait until about March 12th, 1946, a period of two months
before he talked with Stewart. It is very evident that
plaintiff sent the bill to Ellis on February 1st, 1946, and
\vhen Ellis saw the size of the account, then he decided to

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

sell the place, collect his equity, and leave town. This
inference is supported by the fact that Ellis listed the
property for sale on February 18th.
Plaintiff and his foreman Earl, attempted to show
by their testimony that a statement was mailed to Stewart about February 15th, but that testimony is disputed
by the uncontradicted evidence. The documentary evidence, (Exhibits 1 and 2; Tr. 49, 50) and Exhibits D, H,.
and J.; Tr. 52, 53 and 54) clearly refute the testimony
of the plaintiff and Mr. Earl. For instance, if plaintiff
and Earl had talked with Stewart about _February 12th
as they testiifed, (Tr. 108,) Stewart and Harrison would
not have paid Ellis $800.00, knowing that Stucki had an
unpaid repair bill against Ellis of .over $300.00 And,
plaintiff and Earl testified that after they talked to Stewart and he disowned the bill, they went to Ellis' home and
found it vacant, and found that Tarbet was painting iL
-( Tr. 111, 112). It is doubtful that Ellis and his family
would vacate the property before they sold it, and certainly Tarbet would not be painting the home before he
bought it. The sale was not closed until February 26th,
and the deed to Tarbet, (Ex. 2) was not executed and
delivered until March 1, 1946. And plaintiff testified
that as soon as he learned that Ellis had quit his job and
had vacated his home which he claims that he learned
about February 15th to the 17th, ( Tr. 113) he told Tarbet that he intended to file a mechanic's lien on the property. If Tarbet had learned as early as February 17th,.
that a lien was about to be filed against the property he
intendend to purchase, would Tarbet not have insisted
that this debt be paid out of Ellis's s~are of the purchase
price? The lien was executed and filed on March 15,
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1948, (Tr. 48) so this is further proof that it was about
i\1arch 12th, and not February 12th, when plaintiff talked
with Stewart and Tarbet.
The foregoing definitely proves that plaintiff and
Earl \vere mistaken about the tin1e they talked with Stew:..
art and Tarbet, and if they were mistaken about that,
they could also be mistaken about their contention that
defendant Stewart n1ade an original promise to pay this
bill. Remember that more than two years elapsed between the occurrence of this transaction and the date of
the trial. ( Tr. 103)
And moreover, if Stewart had
made that promise and became personally liable, it isn't
likely that he would have settled with Ellis without proof
that the bill was paid. The plaintiff testified that as soon
as Stewart disowned the bill and plaintiff then found the
home vacant, he immediately turned the matter over to
his attorney and the notice of intention to claim a lien
was filed. (Tr. 119) on March 15, 1946.
. ARGU1v1ENT AND AUTHORITIES
The rule of law is well established that to hold a person liable on an original promise such as plaintiff is contending for in this case, the pl~adings and evidence must
show that credit was given exclusively to the promisor.
If credt is also extended to the person for whose benefit
the promise is made, the promise is collateral and within
the statute, 27 C. J. 142, Section 141; Wood on the Statute of Frauds, Page 98. A promise to pay for the goods
delivered to another is collatral and within the statute
of Frauds. Sherperd v. Clements (Ala. app.) 141 So ..
245; Allen v. Smith and Braud, 133 So. 599; Waldock v.
First National Bank (Okla.) 143 Pac. 53; Forster-Davis
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Motor Corp. v. Abraus ( Okla) 53 P. ( 2d) 569.
In 27 C. J. 142, the rule is stated thus:

"But in all such cases it is requisittthat credit should
be given exclusively to the promisor; if any credit is given
to him for whose benefit the promise is made the promise is collateral and within the statute.;,'
In Wood on the statute of Frauds, Page 98, the rule
is stated:

"In all such cases it is requisite that credit should be
given exclusively to the promisor; if any credit be given
to him for whose benefit the promise is made, the promisor is not liable unless his promise is in writing, and this
is so although the collateral undertaking may have been
the principal inducement to the delivery of the goods."
In the case of Waldock v. First National Bank, supra,.
the Supreme Court of Oklahoma states the rule in the
following language:

t:t:Where money is loaned or goods sold to R. for his
use and benefit, and credit is extended to R and W jointly, or if credit is extended to R, W:1 s promise to pay is collateral, and comes within the statute of Frauds, unless
it is in writing.>>
There is no evidence in the record that credit was
extended exclusively to Stewart, and there is no evidence
that the account was even charged against him. But,
there is a strong inference from the evidence that the account was charged against Ellis alone. And plaintiff
alleges in paragraph four of his complaint, (Tr. 2) that,
-"Plaintiff :\'H'H~<was induced to repair the same by said
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James Ellis and W. H. Stewart, under promise and agreenlent by them to pay the repair bill in full as soon as the
\vork was completed.:J:J Thus the complaint alleges an indebtedness against Ellis, for whose property the repair
was n1ade. Therefore, by joining Ellis with Stewart, the
latter \vould be only a guarantor.
Plaintiff has thus pleaded himself squarely within
the statute. And from the evidence i/appears that plaintiff was not relying upon Stewart personally but upon insurance that was reported to be upon the property. (Tr.
131).
We submit that plaintiffs pleading and theory is
precisely like that in the Montana case of Fortman vs.
Leggerini, 152 Pac. 33, where the Court said:

ccwe think it perfectly clear from the record that the
whole course of the litigation up to the time the motion
for nonsuit was made preceeded upon the theory of guaranty, and whether the plaintiff, after pleading and trying
his case upon that theory, can now vindicate the judgment as for an original obligation, is, to say the least, open
to serious doubt.''
Thus from the pleadings and the evidence, according
to the above cases and authorities, the trial court was
within the law in granting Stewart's motion for non-suit
and judgment of dismissal.
II

When the action is brought jointly against the person
who received the merchandise as well as the alleged guar-
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antor, the courts hold that the promise is collateral and
not original. In the Oregon case of Masters vs. Bidler
et. al. 198 Pac. 912, the plaintiff sued both the person who
received the merchandise as well as the alleged guarantor.
The court held that the promise was not original but collateral.
~'If

we now apply the test established by the law, the
conclusion must be that the promise of Townley was a collateral one. It will be recalled that, when asked ''On
whose credit did you extend-did you deliver these goods?'>
Perkins answered, "Well, on Mr. Tow1iley's principally,
because we didn't know Mr. Bidler; only just what Mr.
Townley had told us, is all." Thus it appears from the
testimony of Perkins himself that credit was given to
T otvnley "Principally"; and this is only another way of
saying that credit was in part given to Bidler. More over,
the plaintiffs subsequently treated Bidler as a debtor, and
finally they sued Bidler, together with Townley, on the
theory that Bidler was also liable, and they prosecuted
that theory to a judgment against Bidler.'' (Underlined
Supplied).
And in the case of Atlas Coal Con1pany vs. Tompkins, 158 Pac. 1106, the Supreme Court of Kansas said:
"And there can be no claim that the plaintiff ceased
to hold. Turner liable in the face of the fact that he was
sued on the same claim sometime after the transactions
in October."
In the case of Forster-Davis Motor Corporation vs.
Abraus, (Okla.) 53 P. ( 2d) 569, the alleged promisor and
the third party were sued jointly on a debt, and the Su-
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pre1ne Court of Oklahoma referred to the plaintiffs' complaint to show that the plaintiff relied upon the beneficiary as well as the alleged promisor for payment of the
debt.

111
As we have heretofore shown, there are facts and
circumstances in this case which prove that plaintiff did
not rely upon Stewart to pay this obiigation. The Courts
hold that the nature of the promise is usually to be determined by the trial court, or a jury, as a question of fact,
and the finding of the trial court or jury is binding upon
the Appellate Court. This is especially true where the
question whether the promise was original or collateral
and the language used is not clear or definite; and, where
as here, the plaintiff did not charge the account against
Stewart, and coupled with Stewart's denial that he promised to pay the obligation. Thus the evidence being uncertain and in conflict, the court sitting as a trier of the
facts had a right to \Veigh the evidence and consider all
the conflicting facts and circumstances and its finding
that the alleged promise of Stewart was not original but
collateral, and thus within the statute, is binding upon
this Court.
This rule was adhered to by the Supreme Court of
Oklahoma in the case of Kimbrel vs. Long ( Okla) 65 P.
(2d) 475, where that Court held:

(CThe Court having submitted the issue directly to the
fury as to the primary liability of the defendants, and
there being evidence to support the verdict of the fury,
such veridct may not be disturbed by this court."
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The same rule was laid down by the Supreme Court
of Montana in the case of McGowan Commercial Company vs. l\1idland Coal & Lumber Company, 108 Pac.
655. The Court said:
"But whether Clark intended to bind himself or the
defendant company was a question of fact for the jury to
determine from all that was said and done and from all
other surrounding facts and circumstances. Gerber v.
Stuart, 1 Mont. 172; 1 Am. & Eng. Ency. Law (2d Ed.)
1121; 31 Cyc. 1553; 2 Ency. L. & P., 920-923) ."
The Supreme Court of Oregon in. the case of McMillian vs. Dickover 248 Pac. 154, cited by counsel on
pages 18 and 19 of respondents brief, lays ?own the rule
in the following language:
.:.:Where the language used by the parties is ambiguous and the intention is not clear, it is a question of fact
for the jury as to whether a promise is original or collateral. Masters et. al. v. Bidler et. al., supra; Mackey v. Smith
et. al, supra. As stated in 25 R.C .L. 490."
.:.:Where the language used, together. with the surrounding facts and circumstances, makes it doubtful
whether the parties intended by the promise to create an
original or a collateral obligation, the intention should be
determined by the jury.''
We respectift~ly submit that in view of the facts and
circumstances in the case at bar that the finding of the
trial court is final, because giving the plaintiff's testimony
the most favorable view it does not amount to a definite
and direct promise on the part of Stewart to be originally
obligated to pay this debt.
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IV
The plaintiff's theory in the trial court and in his brief
seen1s to be that Stewart had an interest in the property
and therefore he \Vould be anxious to have the repairs
made. This contention is far fetched. In the first place,
Stewart had no personal interest in the property. His
daughter June owned an equity in the san1e but she was
amply protected under her contract.
On page 17 of plaintiff's brief, counsel says Stewart
does not claim that his promise was a collateral obligation. Stewart expressly pleaded (Tr. 18) that the alleged promise was within the Statute of Frauds.
Counsel repeatedly states in his brief that plaintiff
relied upon Stewart's promise. But plaintiff's conduct
and actions belie his words. If plaintiff was relying
solely upon Stewart, then why did he not charge
the account against Stewart. Why was this fact not
proved at the trial? ·The record is silent upon this point.
And moreover, if Stewart was responsible on an original
promise, as contemplated by Section 33-5-6 ( 2), then
why did plaintiff also join the other defendants and seek
the foreclosure of a mechanics lien? This would strongly indicate that plaintiff did not regard too highly his purported claim against Stewart.
In conclusion defendant Stewart, respectfully submits:
(a) There is no evidence in the record that he made
an original promise to pay this debt.
(b) That at most, his promise is collateral and within the statute.
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(c) That plaintiff was guilty of laches in bringing
the unpaid condition of his debt against Ellis to the attention of one or more of the defendants herein named.
(d) That the defendant Stewart and Tarbet acted
with due care in checking upon any claims that may have
affected this property by having the abstract of title (Ex.
1, Tr. 81) certified to March 4, 1946. If plaintiff had filed
his intention to claim a lien in due time, it would have appeared in the abstract extension, and his debt would have
been satisfied from Ellis' equity in the property.
WHEREFORE, it is respectfully submitted that the
finding and judgment in favor of W. H. Stewart, granting
his motion for dismissal and non-suit be affirmed and
that he recover his costs expended herein.
Respectfully Submitted,
L. E. NELSON
Attorney for Cross-Respondent,
W. H. Stewart
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